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Since the early twentieth century, Venezuela has relied on its oil industry to
maintain a constant national revenue. This dependency on one resource has grown over
the decades and even today, Venezuela still has not diversified its industrial base. The
increase in oil prices and revenue during the 1970's gave Venezuela and the administration
of Carlos Andres Perezthe opportunity bothto combat poverty and to firnnel money into
new areas of industry. Instead of exploring new economic investment plans however, the
government followed the financial plans of past administrations. The result was that
Venezuela increased its dependence on oil revenue, neglected social refornq and borrowed
heavily abroad.
Carlos Andres Perez,the president during the oil boonr, increasingly isolated
himself from Congress, his political party, his advisors, and reality. Although his
presidential authority allowed Perezto bypass Congressional oversight ofhis programs, he
unfortunately embarked on a series ofunrealistic and poorly researched economic
progftuns. Perez's loyal advisors regularly avoided criticizing his policies despite a need
for discussion. Congress failed to provide sufficient oversight. Not only had the Accion
Democratica (AD) Party obtained a rnajority in Congress, but AD also had majorities in
the municipal governments. At first Perez ignored his political opposition so they adopted
radical positions, which divided the government just when political cooperation was
needed.
Problems within the government bureaucracy only added to this economic failure.
Venezuelan government departments that dealt withthe oil industry, such as the Ministry
of Mines and Hydrocarbons, were not unified organizations and often viewed other
departments with suspicion and distrust. The refusal to share information among
departments was worsened after r:mrtionalization when Venezuelans who had worked for
forergn oil companies were viewed by government officials as remaining loyal to the
foreign companies. Venezuelan officials and executives lacked the experience and
,)
knowledge to effectively budget and invest the massive amount of new revenue the oil
boom provided. Patronage and big business concerns frequently controlled most of the
new revenues, only to invest them in ventures that did not diversify the industrial base or
radically improve social conditions or alleviate poverty. Other problems which hurt
business interests were high levels of inflation, government subsidies, overse{B borrowing,
and government spending. The government needed to control the money supply to create
an attractive investment environment. The view that the Perez administration led the
Venezuelan economy to disaster by failing to budget effectively is shared by numerous
authors.
A complete understanding ofVenezuelan development during the 1970's can be
discerned &om the perspectives of several authors. The Nationalization of Venezuelan
QiL published:rr.lgTT, and written by Morris Morley, James F. Petras, and Steven Smittt
focuses on the rise of nationalism in oil producing countries that have traditionally been
categorized as third world countries. The authors analyze the political system and the
political parties that formed the Venezuelan political left. The analysis is based on
Venezuelan class interactions and how the left wing promoted their political agendas. The
Venezuelan political left is described as having to combat a political system that increased
the power of the national government and furthered the interests of the private sector,
both actions proved negative inthe economic long-run.1
Another political-economic perspective is offered by Gustavo Coronel, author of
The Nationzrlization ofthe Venezuelan Oil Industry, published in 1983, which is a case
study. He describes experiences and factors of both people and economic entities that
influenced or were influenced by the rr;tionalization of the Venezuelan oil industry. He
explores the years from 1878 to 1983, focusing on govemment policy and the degree that
private industry was included in the economy after nationalization. He describes a
political-industrial structure that did not undergo any major changes and increased
tensions between Venezuelan officials, dividing the government.2
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Another view on Venezuelan history is offered by Richard A. Haggerty, editor of
Venezuel4 a country study, published in 1993. It is an American federal government
study of Venezuela written by a team of social scientists. The focus is on the people of
Venezuela and how their opinions, attitudes, and beliefs influenced history. Information is
drawn from all available documents such as interviews, newspapers, official reports, and
other books. The study is composed of factual information that describes the industrial
development and financial policies of the Venezuelan government.3
An in-depth analysis of how oil has influenced Venezuelan economics is described
in The Paradox.of Plenty, by Terry Lynn IGrl, published m 1997. Karl analyzes the failure
of Venezuela to effectively budget the revenue it received during the 1970's. Karl
specifically analyzes the political-economic structure to interpret how decisions were made
based on political preference and economic ability. Venezuela is used as an exarnple of
how oil centered nations failed to break fromprevious economic policies and did not
advance any social or economic reforms that drastically changed their nation. He used
local studies on Venezuela while cornparing those studies to other regional histories. Karl
writes how Venezuelan government policies increased the power ofthe private sector and
the government without radically changing social conditions.4
II. Economic Analysis Models
One way of analyzing Venezuela's problem is through the sectoral approach.
According to author Terry Lynn IGrl, this analysis begins with an explanation ofthe
leading sector. It then looks at other economic factors, such as ta><es, which influence and
support the oil industry. It then examines how deeply ingrained and/or reoccurring a
specific policy result affects the nation. A central assumption ofthis approach is that
nations with similar economies should have similar development patterns. The specific
cause of this "sameness" is the origin of government revenues and how that revenue is
used. In contrast to European nations, most periphery and/or developing nations, such as
Venezuel4 have relied on external sources of revenue. This focus on industrialized
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nations is not useful when applied to developing nations. Karl's book attempts to solve
this problem by demonstrating how the sources of a nation's revenue influence all levels of
its political institutions: the state; the regime; and the government. The state is the
permanent structure that irnplements choices in a nation. The regime is the collection of
people, rules, and organizations that determine how changes are made. The government
consists of the people that dominate and control a regime. Sources of national revenue
influence how a state organizes its political structures and policies. But each political level
is affected differentlS especially the degree of how far a nation can intervene and/or
change its economy.
Another economic approactr, used by Karl in his analysis of VenezuelUto amlyzn
the Venezuelan economy is the'hrining state'o model, meaning nations that rely on a single
resource for maintaining their economy and face extreme difficulty in changing economic
patterns, one example being the Venezuelan oil industry. Business and governnent
interests resist any change that threatens to deprive them of power. Economic power is
held by the government, which controls the industry supplying most of the revenue. The
stability of the political structure is dependent on the stability of the economic structure.
Oil states can derrand high prices for their oil with minimal investment. Government
authority is weakened as private and public concerns search for ways to gain a part of the
revenue, not plan for the future. The dependence on oil can turn these nations into
"petro-states." When oil revenue drarnatically increases, these states see the "boorrtl'as
evidence to increase oil operations to gain more revenue deppite the fact that larger
progftuns will eventually fail when oil prices dtop.S
A variant of the mining state model is the "petro-state." A petro-state is a nation
whose ecoromy is dominated by the oil industry. The World Bank categorizes a
petro-state as one in which l0 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 40
percent of total merchandise exports are oil. The subset of countries that includes
Venezuela and much ofthe Middle East are the "capital-deficient oil exporter'o nations.
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Capital-deficient oil e4porter nations usually have a large skilled labor force and a more
diversified economy than capital-surplus counterpart nations. They generally absorb all of
their revenue and usually are net importers of capital. Capital-deficient nations are highly
reliant on oil e4ports and fear the draining of oil reserves more than an oil market crash.
They have an incentive to diversify wtrile large amounts of revenue are available, yet their
decisions tend to be short-term ones. They feared that oil reserves would run dry before
another opportunity presented itself
An new type of analysis, described by IQrl, is the cross regional comparisorl the
study of similar circumstances that lead to similar results in different nations, sometimes in
different time periods, such as Venezuela and oil in the 1970's or Spain and precious
metals in the sixteenth century. This is a combined research design that examines
similarities despite contrasting circumstances. New categories are encouraged to account
for the different economic levels of developing countries. Cross regional studies also
show why oil dependent countries may suffer the same fate despite geographical and
po litical differences. 6
III. The Origins of Nationalizing the Oil Industry
The move towards oil nationalization began before the Perez government. His
predecessor, Rafael Caldera ofthe of the Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral
Independiente (COPEI) party, increased government control over oil resources by raising
the tax rate on forergn oil companies to 70 percent in 1971. In that sailre year Caldera
decided to zupport Alvaro Silva Calderon's Hydrocarbons Reversion Law bill. This
legislation sought to solve the question of what would happen to the oil industry when the
concessions granted to foreign oil companies expired. The Hydrocarbons Reversion Law
had four general provisions: (l) all concessions and other properties owned by the
companies would become the property ofVenezuela whenthe concession e4pired; (2)
une4ploited concession land would return to government ownership in the three years
after the law's enactment; (3) companies would be required to file a "bond" with the
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government totaling l0 percent ofthe total value ofthat companies installations, thus
maintaining the equipment's working condilion; (4) company operations and plans in
Venezuela would require approval of the government and the government would control
where oil wells could be drilled. Caldera's decision to support the bill, despite political
opposition, marked the start of the government showing a more nationalistic attitude to
the oil industry and questioning the oil company's descisions.T
Government control over the oil industry was strengthened additionally with
decree 832, which ui.l97l authorized the National Executive to fix oil export prices
unilaterally, replacl:g a qystem of reference pricmg established in the 1960's. The
government would be able to predict the level of oil production per company and the
income tax that the oil corypany would have to pay for the year. Decree 832 which stated
that "exploration, production, refining, and sales prograrnso'of oil companies required the
approval ofthe Ministry ofMines and Hydrocarbons in advance before being implemented
in actual practice.S
Debates over the law of reversion foreshadowed the debates over the
tntionalization of oil. In1972 the Venezuelan Attorney General J.G. Andueza" defended
the law. The ur,ain argument between the oil companies and the government was whether
equipment related to the concession, but built outside the concession area, would become
the property ofthe Venezuelan government. The law ofreversion and decree 832 were
followed by an immediate drop in oil output by ten percent. The Venezuelan Central
Bank blamed the drop on lower tanker rates, allowing the Mddle East an advantage,
while the Ministry ofMines and Hydrocarbons stated that there were no valid reasons for
the drop. Politicians, such as F. Faraco, president ofthe Committee of Mines and
Hydrocarbons, blamed the oil companies for shutting down 700 wells in retaliation against
government policy. Even after the official nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 this
hostility increased and continued. This controversy even pitted Venezuelans against each
I
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other. Government officials viewed themselves as patriots, but they considered
Venezuelans who worked for foreign oil companies untrustworthy opportunists.g
During the *lame-duck" period ofthe Caldera presidency,1973-1974, the
problems that Caldera had not solved became increasingly obvious. Political pressure had
increased to nationalize the oil industry and support for nationalization was shown by
other members ofthe government such as Pedro Pablo Aguilar, secretary general of
COPEI. Pressure came from government officials, political parties, and even from some
oil companies like Shell and Creole, which offered to negotiate for better terms when they
realir,edthat natiorlalization was inevitable. The Caldera administration had generated
record high deficits in 1970 and 1972, dramatically increasing the public debt. Oil revenue
had not been controlled by the government and the public sector gained more influence in
the national ."orro*y. I 0
During the elections of 1973 for the presidency, National Congress, legislative
assernblies, and the municipal councils, candidates rarely mentioned the oil issue during
their campaigns. They made references to the oil industry only when the campaigns
approached their end. COPEI's candidate, Dr. Lorenzo Fernandez,may have avoided the
oil issue to not embarrass Rafael Caldera of his own party. Fernandez, at the end of his
campaign, claimed he would exploit the Orinoco Tar Strip if elected. The AD party and
its candidate, Carlos Andres Perez,likewise avoided the oil issue until a govemment study
could be undertaken to help determine the best course for his goal, the mtionalization of
the oil industry.l I
IV. The Oil Boom
In1973, Venezuela reaped an unprecedented increase in oil revenues. These
profits were a direct result of the Arablsraeli War that started m 1973 and resulted in the
price of crude oil quadrupling in two months. The reason behind the increase was the oil
embargo that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed on the
United States and Western nations in retaliation for their support of Israel. This price
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increase presented the newly elected Carlos Andres Perez, with a unique opportunity.
Perez's campaigrl "Democracia con Energi4" Democracy with Energy, suggested
innovative ideas. Although the Venezuelan government received more oil revenue in five
years than the total revenue collected during all previous administrations since l9l7 ,Perez
failed to restructure the economy. He became trapped in the "ocages' of the past," used
by previous governments to manage Venezuela's oil dominated economy. The movement,
and subsequent failure, to diversify the Venezuelan economy was influenced by three
factors: the 1973 price increase; Perez's, and the AD party's, landslide victory; and the
realization that Venezuela could no longer rely solely on oil for the rnajority of its national
,au"nu".l2
Perez did decide to nationalize the Venezuelan oil industry. On January 1,1976
fourteen foreign oil companies lost their property, they did not strongly oppose the move,
however, because the new ta:r rates had lowered their profits. The companies received
only 30 percent of the value ofthe oil they extracted while the government received 70
percent. Many Venezuelan oil employees actually saw nationalization as a way to
organize the inefficient Venezuelan bweaucracy. The Ministry of Mines and
Hydrocarbons, which oversaw the operation of foreign oil companies, had never been an
unified organization, and the departments (hydrocarbons, reversion, local market,
petroleum economics, geology) competed for political power and rarely shared
information The leading friction was between Calderon Berti and Arevalo Reyes, the
directors of the reversion and hydrocarbon departments. The two departments did not
cooperate and the oil companies had to duplicate thousands of documents for the
reversion department because the hydrocarbons department would not share their copies.
Nationalization meant avoiding intense bureaucratic pressure and saving thousands of
hours used for duplicating documents regarding oil e4ploration and refining plans.13
Each company received one billion dollars fromthe Venezuelan government in
compensation for the nationalization of their industry, although this amount was far lower
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than the total value of their investments, including twelve oil refineries and 12,500 oil
wells. The plan re-organiznd the companies into four government entities and placed them
under the supervision of the Petroleos de Venezuela, S. A. (PDVSA), which was directed
by the former head of the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), General Rafael
Alfonso Ravard. lvlany of the Venezuelan employees who had worked for the foreign oil
companies retained their positions inthe new govemment entities. Some Venezuelan
political parties and employees of the original Venezuelan state oil corporation, the
Corporacion Venezolana del Petroleo (CVP), believed that the foreign oil companies still
retained their influence in Venezuela ttrough their former employees. This lack of trust
foreshadowed the political disagreements concerning economic policies.
Perczcontributed heavily to this ill-will when he introduced his own
rntiornlization bill to Congress. Perez, lra1974, had created the Presidential Commission
on Reversioq consisting of nearly all of the Venezuelan intellectual and economic sectors.
The commission had presented Perczwith a draft law that only the Fedecamaras did not
support. Perez however, supported a different bill" supported only by the AD, which
contained Article 5. That article irnplied that foreign corporations might return as partial
owners in the oil industry and it destroyed any hope of political unity. When the AD
ratified the bill, opposition came from COPEI, MAS, M& and all the other political
parties. COPEI also boycotted the nationalization ceremony. Internal disagreements
about economic policies within the AD party resulted in the unwise decision to borrow
heavily from foreign banks. The need for foreign financing was forurded on the fact that
Perez's social and economic development projects could not be financed solely be oil
,"ro"r,r".l4
PDVSA fell under Article 6 of the nationdization law, otherwise known as the
Law Reserving the Production and Marketing of Hydrocarbons to the State. It stated that
the 'Yenezuelan executive would be able to 'create the enterprises necessary for the
regular and efficient development of [all activities relative to the exploratioq exploitatiorl
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refining and marketing ofhydrocarbons]."' One ofthese enterprises would be responsible
for "'the duties of co-ordination, supervision and control ofthe activities to be undertaken
by the rest of the companies."'15
Perezofficially created the PDVSA on August 30, 1975, by executive decree
1123, to take over control and supervision duties. When nationalization took place, the
concessionaires ceded their places to 13 nationalized operating companies. The
nationalized companies were not combined into larger companies and that helped maintain
the established ownership and operating structures that were already in place. Allowing
the existing structure to continue avoided disruptions to oil productivity until the
companies could be merged together without disrupting oil productivity. In July 1976, the
five largest companies (Lagoveq Maraven, Meneven, Llanoven, and CVP) formed a plan
to divide the nationalized businesses into five groups: companies with large organizations,
medium-sized companies, small companies that would be integrated into larger companies
in the short-tenn, marginal companies that would be integrated into larger companies at
once, and the original state oil company, the CVP.
V. Government Economic Policy
The Perez government followed the economic policies ofpast administrations, the
only difference that it implemented them on a larger scale. The result was negative
policies were exaggerated and new problems emerged. The government lost political
unity, as opposition &omthe left became more radical. The Venezuelanpeople believed
that the revenue had given Venezuela the ability to finally restructure the nation into the
dream of 'ol,a Gran Venentela." Perez envisioned rapidly modemizing an oil centered
natio& rather than a more modest change in the country's course. The reality was that
"La Gran Venezuela" left little room for real choice, but left a lot of room for
contradictory economic policies. Inflation became a major problem. In an attempt to
avoid it the government tried to control the money supply. Officials followed previous
financial policies and simply enlarged the political battles over who would control the
11
money supply. Private conceflrs versus public concerns,labor versus owner, these
arguments decreased restraint on govenrment spending. Perez had two choices: save the
money for the future or build an industrialized, first world "La Gran Venezuela."
Considering the resources, the second route was obvious.l6
Perez, in an interview on October 13,1975 with Rusiness Week magazine, said
that Venezuela could no longer afford to have the Western nations dictate the price of
Venezuelan oil. The first world and the third world, he argued, had to find ways to exist
as equals, rather then continuing a dominant-subordinate relationship. The best thing for
Venezuela would be to have free trade regulated bythe government. International
corporations would maintain ties with Venezuela, but would not control the flow of
technology into third world nations. Percz stated that the one thing that had to happen
was that import and e4port prices had to balance out.17
The scope of the revenue increase of 1972-1975 was unprecedented in Venezuelan
history. In those years, oil prices rose from $2.10 to $10.90 per barrel, a 419 percent
increase. Venezuelan fiscal income more thantripled as international reserves went from
1.7 billion dollars to 8.9 billion dollars, t}is was nearly 40 percent of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).
Before l973,the Venezuelan president had to rely on building political alliances in
Congress. This was not the case, however, for the Perez administration because the AD
party held majorities in both houses. Perezhad received 48.7 percent of the votes for
president, and the AD party gained control of 28 out of 49 Senate seats, 102 out of 203
Charnber ofDeputy seats, and control of every state government except hiln. Despite
internal disagreements, AD legislators voted the party line, and thus did not exercise fiscal
control over the president. This lack of outside scrutiny diminished further as Perez
named eight cabinet ministers who were political independents, but were loyal to him.
Perezbuilt his own network of supporters when he had helped rebuild the AD party
following its defeat in 1968. Lack of legislative and industrial oversight prevented any
U
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effective criticism of Perez's policies. In l974,however, few people noticed this and
could predict the consequences of nullifting the system of checks and balances on the
president.lS
perez,s strategy of decreasing dependence on oil revenue igfrored the agricultural
sector and concentrated on industrial economic power. Perez, in the wake of the revenue
increases of 1972-1,975, abandoned his original intention to "manage abundance with the
mentality of scarcity" and proceeded to institute plans designed to spread the wealth
across all social classes and build'ol-a Gran Venezuela." Perez's government subsidized
food production, increased foreign imports oflunrry goods, cancelled a 350 million dollar
debt owed to government agencies by the Venezuelan farming community, and increased
working wages. The Law ofUnjustified Dismissals, passed 
'tn1974, made it more difficult
for employers to fire employees and doubled public employment by 1978. However, while
unernployment dropped, more'tndesirable" jobs were givento illegal immigrants from
Colombia and Brazil. The government's plan improved the lives of all Venezuelans, but
the poor still remained poor alongside the more afluent middle class. One report stated
the 40 percent of the Venezuelan public lived in poverty'
perez's "La Gran Venezuela" differed only fiom previous development plans in
scope and speed of implementation. Perez's proposed development projects to diversify
the economy and fight poverty, before oil reserves went dry. The core ofthis plan was the
t.y1tio1g1;liz,ation of steel and oil, taking advantage of Venezuela's mineral and fuel supplies.
By l976,of the 27.186 billion dollars invested under the Fifth National PlarU a
government strategy to direct economic development and investment, 60 percent had been
allocated to the mining and oil sectors. Despite the fact that previous plans along similar
lines had failed to eliminate povefly, government planners believed that the increase in oil
revenue would allow their plan to succeed. Poverty had been the result of the government
directing most of its resources towards oiL The additional revenue influx would allow
planners to sustain the oil industry while diversify'rng the economy, thereby creating jobs.
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The basis for industrialization was the oil industry the core of the economy. Venezuelans,
not foreigners, would profit from the industry. \,/s11E2uslans had to face the fact that no
new oil reserves had been discovered since 1958 and existing oil reserves were expected
to last only twenty years. Oil production had decreased as foreign companies had
prepared for the industry's twtiorollization In additioru the Orinoco Oil Belt, believed to
contain 1.8 trillion barrels, required new technology to pwify the crude oil reserves of
sulfur and metal. The president of Petroleos de Venezuela (PETROVEN), General
Alfonzo Ravard, estimated that 1.61 billion dollars would be required to fully utilize the
Orinoco's potential.l9 Another reason for Venezuelan worries was that the definition of
'?ecoverable" oil had been changed. In 1973, Venezuelan oil reserves were 13.8 billion
barrels, by 1974 reserves totaled 18.6 billion barrels. This increase was the result of
government officials declaring marginal oil fields commercially recoverable. The
disadvantage wns that these reserves were profitable only when oil prices were rising.2o
VI. Economic Consequences on the Private Sector
Venezuelan industries received massive government subsidies to build a
high-technology ffiastructure and large scale industrial projects. The government created
new autonomous and semiautonomous industries in shipping, textiles, and
hydroelectricity, and gave them massive government funding. By 1978, state-owned
industries had a budget that was 50 percent higher than the total federal budget. The
premiere investment was the industrial cornplex at Ciudad Guayan4 which was directed
by the CVG. This had been started in the 1960's by the government to decentralize
industry away from Caracas and attracted private and public investors including the
Siderurgica del Orinoco (Sidor), a CVG subsidiary. The government built aluminum and
bauxite refineries along with hydroelectric projects to fully utilize the basin's potential.
SIDOR's president, Luis Jose Hernandez, stated lrl^1975 that the industrial expansion
would cost more thfln2.s billion dollars.2l
t4
Besides aluminum and bauxite, the Fifth National Plan planned for an increase in
steel production from 1.2 millions tons to 9.8 million tons in two new plants, SIDOR Plan
IV and ZWA. Under that plan, the government funded construction of the Guri Dam to
support efforts to exploit the Orinoco Basin's hydroelectric potential. Other
diversification projects included aircrafr manufrcturing, paper mills, and nickel mining.
However, the Fifth National Plan differed from previous government plans in tluee areas.
First, Perez's plan called for building twenty years of industrial development in five to ten
years. Second, Perez's plan mandated that large-scale projects receive top priority at the
cost ofpublic services. Caldera's fourth national plan had allocated 35.4 percent ofpublic
investment for education and government services. Perez's fifth national plan allocated
only 19.9 percent ofpublic investment for education and government services. Third, the
boundaries between private and public enterprises would vanish with nationalization. The
public share of gross fixed investment was to be increased from 32 percent to 53,2
percent.
Under Perezos 5 year plaq the government entered manufacturing sectors that
private capital had previously dominated and private capital was limited to 20 percent
ownership in basic industries and 40 percent in secondary-stage manufacturing. The
government increased its involvement in planning and controlling the Venezuelan
economy. No major organization or group voiced strong resistance or debated alternative
policies. The reason for this widespread acceptance was that Perez was following the
guidelines of previous economie plans, all that changed was the anrount of amount of
money being spent. Private and government officials offered no ahernatives to industrial
development. They remained silent on the issue of agricultural neglect and ignored the
danger of monetary inflation. They also assumed that labor could quickly learn the needed
skills. They failed to question that the government's plan to deliver "La Gran Venezuela"
according to schedule. Critics were ignored or kept silent. Only Juan Pablo Perez
Alforzo, the founder of OPEC, publicly warned that the high oil prices could decline and
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advocated the cutting of oil production to effectively deal with the unprecedented revenue
influx.22 However, Alfonzo's warning was lost in the national rush to build "La Gran
Venezuela."
Following the oil revenue influx was the public fear of inflation destabilizing the
economy. Venezuelan citizens wanted a refurn to the previous l-2 percelrt inflation rate
and Hector Hurtado, Minister ofFinance, warned that the rapid revenue influx "could
become a block of ice that would end up melting on us." Perez, in the first 100 days of his
presidency, responded by issuing decrees, resolutions, and/or draft laws at the amazing
rate oftwo per day. The prices of services and goods were frozen for 90 days and this
was endorsed by political parties and trade uniors.23 He then asked Congress for
approval of the Special Powers Act, which gave him "extraordinary executive authority,oo
so he could enact an income-tax refornr, reorganize public financial institutions, and
decree widespread wage increases. Besides raising ta>( rates on foreign oil companies,
Percz sought to nationalize the iron ore and oil industries.
The justification for these measures was to control the radical changes in national
living standards. Privately, some cabinet members and chief aides felt that Perez wanted
to avoid normal administrative channels and enact policies with a minimum of
congressional debate. The response, led by COPEI, centered on the balance ofpower and
the viability of democracy. Nevertheless, on May 31, 1974, Congress granted perez
"extraordinary executive authority.' Support for this measure came fromthe AD, the
Communist Party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and the Movimiento de Izquierda
Revolucionaria (hflR). Opposition came only from COPEI and the Movimiento Electoral
del Pueblo (I,GP). The Special Powers Act had two rnajor impacts on Venezuelan
politics. First, Perez was now free from even nominal oversight by the AD-controlled
congress. Perezruled the country by decree from May 31, l974,to June l,lg75.
second, coPEI was forced to adopt a more radical political stance.24
t6
Deconsolidation happened at the same time the political system faced new
responsibilities. Even AD, the party that had founded Venezuelan democracy after the
military lost power in 1958, did not amlyze the Special Powers Act and yielded to
grantmg Perez's "extraordinary executive authority''request. With the exception of the
FfV, every other policy could have been submitted for Congressional approval to avoid
confusion The rewriting ofthe Civil Service Code allowed more political appointments
when the nation needed efficient and experienced officials, and further destabilized the
nation when an effective administration was needed to deal with the situation. Perez's
reliance on vague economic proposals for industrialization revealed obstacles, such as a
lack of clear economic planning. The popular belief among the Perez administration was
that difficulties could be solved, technical knowledge could be imported, and oil revenue
would continue to rise despite competition fromNorth Sea and Mexican operations.
Furthermore, they believed the existing industrial structure could support increased
demand, comrption would be controlled, inflation would be not become 6 danger, and
industry was seen as more important than agriculture. LastlS and most importantly, the
belief was the government would maintain a strict budget overseen by numerous and
competent officials. Inthe end, Perez had done nothing more than build an illusion of
prosperity.25
VII. Venezuelan Banks and Labor
Perez wanted to execute the dual goals of ending poverty and controlling the
revenue lnflux. New development plans would benefit all of Venezuelan society. The
dream of "politics without limits," ofthe government qpreading moneyto all social
classes, collapsed with the reality of the wealthier classes demanding their traditional
government subsidios. Plans to control govemment spending and "manage abundance
with the mentality of scarcity" were replaced with ever increasing development costs.
Perez. however, won two victories: first, he reduced oil production from 3.4 million
barels a day in 1973 to 2.3 n 1975; and oil exports dropped from 2.1 million barrels a day
l7
fir1973 to 1.5 million lrr.1975. Lower oil export amounts meant that less revenue entered
the country and slowed the depreciation of industrial equipment, which was operating at
the limit under the oil companies disinvestment policies. Venezuela ranked fifth in
worldwide total oil output n 1974 with an export of 154 million tons of crude oil. This
was 12 percent less than the output of 1973.26
Perez's second strategy was to establish the Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela
(FIV) to manage the sudden increase of six billion dollars in oil revenue. FIV prevented
oil revenue from entering the domestic economy. Revenue was invested overseas until it
could be gradualty reintroduced to the Venezuelan economy. Another investment was the
financing of international cooperation among Central American countries that had suffered
under the oil price increase. FIV was initially given 3.23 billion dollars by the government
and was supposed to receive half of all income from oil sales during Perez's five year term
in office.
The next step by Perez's government was a tax reform that formed a "diversified
fiscal base" and balanced out the currency restriction. Hector Hurtado, Minister of
Finance, envisioned a plan including higher taxes, customs, and levies, and a business and
property ta:<. The goal was to replace oil revenue with ta:r revenue. The plan ran into
widespread protest since the government wanted to raise taxes during a massive inflow of
money. Furthermore, since the FIV firnctioned in the exterior, its income was not
subjected to Congressional and Finance Ministry oversight and instead was directly
supervised by the president. The FIV was only answerable to the president, not a
government ministry.
Perez" intending to eliminate poverty, implemented a series of measures that would
increase consumer purchasing power. Percz decreed the first Venezuelan minimum wage
and set it at 3.50 dollars per day, this decree did not include domestic workers. Next
came a nationwide wage increase that ranged from 5 to 25 percent for employees in the
private and public sectors.
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Following the wage increase and the revenue influn Venezuelans embarked on a
massive spending spree. Venezuela soon ranked as the world's leading consumer of
whiskey.2T Venezuelan domestic production increased, but many items, such as whiskey,
stereos, clothing, foods, and televisions continued to be imported.
Percz also decreed an increase in jobs. Government, white-collar, fixed-position
jobs doubled in five years, and agencies avoid partisan "stacking'o with Decree 211, which
permitted the govemment to increase political appointments along with nonclassified
public employees. This revision of the Civil Service Law allowed Perczto fire people and
then replace themwith employees who supported his policies. Personnel expenditures in
the national budget almost tripled between 1973 and 1979 tfiresponse to inereased
employee numbers and wages. The Law against Ur{ustified Dismissals, enacted by Perez
to counter the fear of increased firings following wage increases, provoked private
business opposition of Perez's policies because the law made it costly for employers to fire
employees. A private business association called Fedecamaras attacked this law as
interfering with private enterprise and in threatening a favorable economic situation.
These businessman feared that capital would leave the country because investors might
interpret this measure as an attack on free enterprise. They demanded clear government
policies and predicted a recession would result if they were not reassured that the
government knew what it was doing.28 Th" dramatic increase in government employees
was also the result of slow growth in private industry the government simply increased its
size without altering its traditional reliance on revenue &om oil.
These private business demands were soon joined by complaints from barrio (low
income sectors) inhabitants, nonunionized workers, others in the popular sector. The
increase in consumer purchasing power had not been rationally planned. The industrial
structure could not respond to the sudden increase in demand. Capital began a mass
exodus from Venezuela as prices soared, investment levels dropped below normal, and a
severe food shortage occured. Perez responded by spreading the wealth to his most
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vehement critics in a classical appeasement strategy. On September 15,lglL,Percz
proclaimed a shift from his populist policies and instead stated that the government would
emphasize productivity by granting tax exemptions to businesses and give them
government subsidies. The General Banking Law was modified by Perez so tax
deductions, up to 20 percent, could be claimed for investments. The construction industry
was granted a tar< exemption for ten years and similar exemptions were gtanted to
agriculture, ranching, and forestry. The most important parts ofthe economic strategy
were two credit funds that gave industry and agriculture one billion dollars each over a
period of five years along with low-cost, long term loans. The combined net transfer of
money was unprecedented. The initial transfer totaled over one billion dollars plus
investments from all ofVenezuela's public development agerrcies.2g Perez's surrender to
private industry simply encouraged the wealthy class to demand more privileges.
Perczdecided to avoid the task of designing a new national financial network to
control the money flow and instead relied on existing financial institutions. Private banks
received huge subsidies and their earnings rose rapidly. Perez, to appease business
interests, then enacted the Law for the Protection ofthe Consumer which replaced
government price controls, and killed an antimonopoly law. This meant the government
would only regulate and subsidize foods judged necessary for a basic diet. Other
consumer products escaped all but partial regulations. Private businesses were also
included in drafting future price-control regulations since their exclusion in 1946. While
the Law against Unjustified Dismissals remained in force, business gained influence in
making economic policies and received a large share of the oil revenue. Following these
actions, business owned newspapers printed stories praising the Venezuelan govemment.
Government spending then spun out of control just when the government need to control
oil revenue. In the year of the Special Power Act, govemment expenditures tripled
without any plan or any definable relationship to productivity. As a consequence, living
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standards rose and the domestic economy d a "boonrl'effect that left some
Venezuelans believing that the prosperity would never end.
Economic wealth and development, invested into imports and commerce projects,
rapidly ran into bureaucratic obstacles and comrption. Only 25 percent of government
projects between 1974-1975 were completed as government deals were full of bribes and
kickbacks. Long-term industrial projects that did not rely on foreign imports or foreign
technical knowledge were neglected in favor of government subsidies that allowed the
private sector to maintain high profits while borrowing technology from other countries.30
Venezuela continued to rely on foreign imports without modernizing its industrial base.
Foreign observers clearly saw Perez's contradictory economic policies. Why
would government plarurers, fearful of inflation and a limited supply of oil, have condoned
a seemingly endless spending spree? To Venezuelan government planners, however, the
policy of diversifying the economy while appeasing interests that could threaten to
effectively undermine the government was perfectly rational. It is true that Venezuelan
economic planners did not expect such a demand for government spending from the
private sector. The fact was that Venezuelan officials only saw the endless revenue from
oil and the political difficulty in not spending money so freely. There was no strong
incentive to restrain the spending spree. The spending should have been restrained,
because, to quote the December 27, 1975 issue of the Economist: "It would be wise to be
a little more cautious in the spending of the oil money. There is nothing wrong at all, even
in these days of financial sophisticatiorU with having some cash in the bank.'31
YIII. Social Conditions and National Debt
The dramatic increase in government spending triggered a domino effect that
infected the government, the economy, and the nation. Perez's initial popularity among
the public along with his "extraordinary executive authority''meant that his progftlllts
received no viable public criticism and no effective government oversight. During Perez's
first year in office, the administration formed no organized economic proposals or
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priorities, just a vague outline of industrial development projects. The complete lack of
political opposition allowed Perez and his subordinates to enact legislation without
research and concrete guidelines. The result was an economic plan in which the
government deemed every act a priority, as historian Terry Lynn Karl observes, '!et, if
everything is a priority, there are in fact no priorities at all." The lack ofproposals for
major industrial changes in the economy revealed that there was no real change from
previous policy. The plan to extract state revertue from the domestic economy was not
followed by a'tedistributive income tax." Not only did the FIV never receive its
mandated half of all oil revenue, after lg75 rtreceived no new oil revenue.32
The patterns ofurban development reflected sharp social divisions in society in
which the poor stayed poor while the middle and upper classes got wealthier. Corporate
skyscrapers and and high-income arqrs, such as hxury apartments, received government
supplies, support, paid labor, and money from banks for investment and construction. By
contrast, low-income areas were settled through illegal occupations of state and private
land, although families did purchase occupancy rights within these areas. Construction
and financing was undertaken by the poor themselves. While some goverrrnent officials
viewed this development as separate from the wealthier classes, the reality is that both
were a part of Venezuela's oil economy. Upper level areas enjoyed connections with
politicians and banks, while low level areas relied mostly on self-help and minimal
government aid. The government's goal to improve housing by subsidizing construction
resulted in higher land and housing prices. Speculators, believing that soaring real estate
prices would last for years, developed and sold more land for housing projects. Yet as
real incomes declined developers abandoned their plans and finished dwellings remained
unsold. The price drop was portrayed to the public by the government as temporary.
Instead, the sudden increase in the housing supply, for the middle class, had exceeded the
demand. Residential development suffered as investors moved capital into other areas.
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City level political leaders, in return for votes, lobbied to get their areas the most
development funding and investments. However, the limits of government spending
meant that not all sectors could receive aid, prompting crty level politicians to ignore
certain land development violations in return for the maintaining the patronage system.
The wealth from oil could have been invested in low-income housing to improve the
conditions of the poor while businesses would have profited from housing construction
and building suppty sales. Instead, a political system that relied on middle and upper class
votes, supporting an ingrained patronage syster4 remained intact and the poor were
neglected. The upper classes received a majority ofthe wealth and invested it in economic
ventures that only benefited the weatthy. While this approach prevented a military coup,
unlike other South American countries in the 1970's, the government sector increased
without stable planning or visible productivity. Most ofthe oil revenue was not
distributed evenly across the social classes and urban development.33
In Maracaibo, hundred of old buildings were demolished during the early 1970's to
make room for an e4panded highway system while new apartment and office buildings
were built on the Lake Maracaibo shoreline.34 Opportunities for urban development,
reinforced by the increase in oil revenue, made real estate seem a profitable investment.
The downside was that the profitability of real estate attracted too much investment. As
the late 1970's brought rising interest rates, economic recession, and decreases in
government spending, land and building sales decreased. Venezuelan companies had
failed to learn the rnanagement procedures and skills needed to sustain a viable
manufacturing ba"".35
The Fifth National Pla4 designed during the Perez administratiou had assumed
that oil prices would sustain high amounts of government spending for the entire decade.
The reality was that oil income leveled offin 1976, as OPEC ended the embargo, and
prices began to decline in 1978. The goverrment therefore turned to foreign banks for
money to continue the plan without making significant alterations. Foreign investments
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and loans faced two outcomes: while Venezuela was an acceptable credirt risk for banks,
the autonomy of government entities allowed for massive borrowing with no central
government accounting. The autonomous government qrtities chose high interest,
short-term loans that led the public-sector to a twelve billion dollar debt by 1978, a
five-fold increase in four y"-r.36 Investment levels remained the same inthe year of
nationalization as industry planned for new expenditures. Investment levels doubled in
1977 andin 1978, vrith 75 percent of the money invested in oil exploration. Exploration
investments totaled 179.4 million dollars, 20 percent of capital expenditures. Refining
investments, which rose by a factor of four, went towards the building of one flexicoker
and two catalytic crackers. E4ploration drilling was undertaken offshore and in the
Orinoco Basin. The rapid expansion followed two decades of contraction before 1975.
By 1975 expenditures had all but been eliminated and managers were reluctant to change a
philosophy ofcaution and austerity. Industrial directors and managers had to switch from
the traditional philosophy of "save" to the new philosophy of "spend wisely.'37
The Venezuelan government's decision to borrow from overseas creditors was
supported by forergn banks that saw a way to gain some of Venezuela's oil revenue and
Venezuela could get favorable terms on credit with its oil collateral. Other industrializrd
countries were bad risks since they were suffering a recession. The credits were spent by
the government, although a wiser course would have been to leave the oil in the ground
for a greater value in the future. Perez focused on speed rather than a plan for cheap
capital that could be invested in new ventures. AD party leaders saw that the amount that
Perczwanted to borrow, 14.734 billion dollars, was extreme. Acting Finance Minister
Ivan Pulido Mora emphasized that the Central Bank had previously objected to borrowing
a sum totaling only 60 percent of Perez's request. Mora argued that a successful debt
strategy required projections on annual investnrents and a development plan, none of
which existed. Mora also argued that excessive borrowing could not be merged with the
previous policy of restricting the money supply to avoid inflation. This criticism led Perez
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to reduce the requested amount from 52.9 billion dollars to 27.6 billion dollars. This
caused a problem as Perez's government still planned on investing in industry along with
more social programs, leading to spending.
Venezuelan bankers did not understand the dangers of borrowing so heavily. A
group of bankers suggested that all investments should be kept liquid form outside
Venezuela. The advantage of this strategy was that the money would serve as foundation
to support larger amounts of overseas bonowing. The disadvantage was that Brazil had
tried this strategy to finance industrial growth and had instead accumulated a22 billion
dollar forergn debt. Brazilian industries had not been able to produce the amount of
exports required to repay the oversea loaos.38 Venezuela would eventually suffer the
same economic fate.
The greatest flaw of the bonowing plan was that the foreign borrowing was
intended to replace a wide-ranging tax-reform policy. Once the borrowing began, it
destroyed any chance of convincing Venezuelans that additional revenue was needed.
Foreign bonowing became a substitute for increased taxes. The Central Bank's report on
Perez's borrowing plan stated that 'the Fifth Plan could be through the combination of
income generated by orl, the state enterprises, and dett alone 'ifthe alternative of
financing the activities ofthe public sector through greater internal ta:ration is postponed
for now."' This statement masked the struggle between Perczn the Central Bank, and the
Finance Ministry over the debt policy and tax reform. Perez finally succeeded in
promoting the debt policy.39
IX. PoliticalDivisions
The failure of the Perezadministration to modernize Venezuela become more
evident as the initial plan to transform Venezuela into a first world nation through massive
industrialization only led to higher national debt, payment deficits, and higher inflation
rates. This was a classic example of an economy falling under the control of oil revenues.
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Imports rose by 30 percent per year while investments failed to produce useful results,
which led to government borrowing and spending lacking any controls.
In 1977 Perczand the government realized that the economy had to be stabilized
before it collapsed. The money supply was curtailed and imports were placed under
increased government control. Perez hoped this would control inflation and limit imports,
but neither hope was realizsd. Perez's successor, Luis Herrera Campins ofthe Comite de
Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI) party, said "that he had received a
mortgaged country."40 Campins' monetary policies included subsidy termination and
price deregulation. This resulted in price increases for consumer products. A subsequent
wage increase, in responso to increased prices, simply stimulated economic inflationary. It
also contributed to cost increases for oil industry operations. Oil industry officials
responded by stating that increased oil revenue would not be sufficient to counter a deficit
imbalance. The solution proposed by the government to save the national economy was
to exploit the Orinoco oil deposits to maintain a steady flow of revenue. However,
development of the Orinoco meant that other sectors of the ecooomy had to relinquish
huge amounts of money fromtheir individual budgets.
Between government spendrng and foreign dett accumulated &om 1973-1978,the
Perczgovernment had spent more money in 5 years than all previous governments
combined. Much of this revenue had been wasted through ineffective government
supervisioq project cost ovemrns, and a myriad of comrpt deals. The failure of the
government to show any viable accomplishments raised doubt among the Venezuelan
public. This widespread public doubt became evident dwing the presidential election of
1978 when the AD party lost to COPEI. COPEI's victory was the rezult of the AD
party's economic failures, the campaigning candidate's political platforms were not a
major factor. The success of COPEI also indicated a decline inthe AD's rural support
base as more people had moved to urban **.41
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Between 1976 and l978,the AD party had neglected economic problems in favor
of political party infighting. Forty-one percent ofthe AD party's 1.3 million party
militants refused to vote during the electiorU evidence ofhow much support the Perez
government had lost. COPEI candidate Luis Herrera Campins said that his AD opponent,
Luis Pinerua Ordaz,was his "best ally.' Every time Ordaz denounced comrption, he
further discredited the Perez administration. The leading figure ofthe 1978 campaign was
Carlos Andres Perez,whose attempts to gain support for the AD party proved ineffective
against increasing suspicions of his involvement inthe comrption and the COPEI slogan of
"Where has the money gone?' Before the elections, a Caracas lawyer, investigating
fraudulent deals involving some of Perez's closest associates, had been ordered killed by
the head of the federal police, a presidential appointee. Perez, after leaving office, was
tried by Congress and escaped by one vote the Congressional censure that would have
denied him the ability to run for reelection More Venezuelans viewed the AD party as
having wasted oil revenue and neglected the national good. In the presidential elections,
Campins received 46.3 percent ofthe vote compared to Ordaz's 43.3 percent. The
Congressional vote was split at nearly 40 percent for each party. The elections of 1978
had been turned into a public trial on the Perez administration. Datos, a polling agency,
found that the Venezuelan public held the AD party responsible for high living prices and
scarce sopplies.42
X. Conclusion
In conclusioru the promise ofthe AD party and Cados Perezto modernize
Venezuela into a first world nation failed, due to a lack of planning or realistic goals.
Perez's economic measures centered on increasing govemment spending during a time
when controlling the money suppty was vital to avoid inflation The emphasis on
subsidizing heavy industries while neglecting agriculture led to higher imports rates,
undermining efforts to reduce the need for foreign goods. The economic measure that
most hurt Venezuela was the plan to borrow heavily from other nations when Venezuela
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should have reformed the tax systerg in*ituted realistic economic goals, and saved much
ofthe revenue for the future.
Venezuela could have avoided a majority of its problems if the political structure
and the leaders had shown more cooperation and pragmatism. The most helpful factor
would have been if Perez and the AD party had included Congress and the other political
parties in determining economic policies. This would have subjected economic planning
to more oversight and nearly eliminated Perez's uncontrolled spending spree. Another
problem that was ignored was the government's failure to regulate the money supply wlren
the economy faced the visible danger of inflation In addition, private business was
included in planning the economy. Business leaders succeeded in lowering government
regulations and maintaining government subsidies, perpetuating a non-sustainable
spending plan. Finally, the nation as a whole believed that the prosperrty would continue
and no plans were formed to deal with the possibility, and reality, of oil prices falling.
As dependency on oil revenue increased, the government could not repay forergn
debts or ilumage an economy suffering from inflation. Living conditions remained the
same, the wealthy got wealthier, the poor stayed poor, and the middle class saw real
incomes first rise and then fall. What Venezuela needed to effectivety build Perez's vision
of a prosperous and modern "La Gran Venezuela" was a completely new method of
economic planning that diversified the economy away from oil and encouraged
cooperation among the Venezuelan political parties.
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